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This paper analyses farmers’ behavioural responses to Government attempts to reduce the risk of disease
transmission from badgers to cattle through badger vaccination. Evidence for two opposing behavioural
adaptions is examined in response to the vaccination of badgers to reduce the risk of transmission to
farmed cattle. Risk compensation theory suggests that interventions that reduce risk, such as vaccination,
are counterbalanced by negative behavioural adaptions. By contrast, the spillover effect suggests that
interventions can prompt further positive behaviours. The paper uses data from a longitudinal mixed
methods study of farmers’ attitudes to badger vaccination to prevent the spread of bovine tuberculosis,
their reports of biosecurity practices, and cattle movement data in 5 areas of England, one of which expe-
rienced badger vaccination. Analysis finds limited evidence of spillover behaviours following vaccination.
Lack of spillover is attributed to farmers’ beliefs in the effectiveness of biosecurity and the lack of simi-
larity between badger vaccination and vaccination for other animal diseases. Risk compensation beha-
viours are associated with farmers’ beliefs as to who should manage animal disease. Rather than
farmers’ belief in vaccine effectiveness, it is more likely that farmers’ low sense of being able to do any-
thing to prevent disease influences their apparent risk compensation behaviours. These findings address
the gap in the literature relating to farmers’ behavioural adaptions to vaccine use in the management of
animal disease.
 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Risk compensation theory suggests that initiatives to reduce
risk are counterbalanced by greater risk taking [1,2]. Studies of
post-vaccination behaviour suggest an association with risk com-
pensation behaviours [3–5]. By contrast, concerns that Human
Papillomavirus vaccination may promote increased sexual activity
[6] have been shown to be false [7,8]. Vaccination may also act as a
‘wedge’ [9] to drive the adoption of additional risk reduction beha-
viours, known as the ‘spillover effect’ [10,11]. Behavioural spil-
lovers are associated with pre-natal care and post-natal
vaccination choices [12], and more generally, environmental prac-
tices such as purchasing organic food, recycling, waste minimisa-
tion, and transport choices [10,13,14]. However, positivebehavioural spillovers may act to legitimise other negative beha-
viours [15] or they may be limited by low ‘self-efficacy’ [16]: feel-
ings of fatalism and being unable to prevent ill-health or disease.
Whilst vaccination is connected to both these behavioural
adaptions, there are no studies of risk compensation or behavioural
spillovers in relation to the use of animal disease vaccines. This is
surprising because the pre-conditions for risk compensation sug-
gested by Hedlund [1] apply equally to animal keepers, such as
farmers, as to the general public. These include: the intervention
must be visible; have an effect on risk perception; there must be
a motivation to increase risk taking (for example, economic incen-
tives); and individuals have the ability to adapt their behaviour (as
opposed to being restricted by regulation). Expected and unex-
pected positive, negative and neutral behavioural responses to ani-
mal disease interventions should therefore be anticipated [17].
Given the potential consequences of these behavioural adap-
tions to animal disease management, it is imperative to determineith the
2 G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxxthe conditions in which such behavioural adaptions occur, yet
there are few studies of risk compensation and/or behavioural spil-
lover in the animal disease management literature. The aim of this
paper is therefore to examine farmers’ behavioural responses to
policies designed to reduce the risk of transmission of bovine
tuberculosis (bTB) from wildlife to cattle. Despite the volume of
epidemiological research on the transmission of bTB, there have
been no studies examining the impact of wildlife interventions
on farmer behaviour. The paper therefore addresses this gap in
the literature by examining the extent and reasons for risk com-
pensation and spillover behaviours amongst farmers in areas
where wildlife have been vaccinated to prevent the spread of dis-
ease, with those in comparison areas.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. 1 Background: Bovine tuberculosis and the vaccination of wildlife
In the United Kingdom, bTB is recognised as the most challeng-
ing animal disease problem [18] resulting in the slaughter of
approximately 56,000 cattle per annum [19,20] at an annual cost
to the taxpayer of £100 million [21]. Whilst cattle can transmit
the disease between themselves, or translocate the disease by
moving between farms, wildlife – notably badgers – are implicated
in the spread of disease [22]. As a culturally iconic species [23], the
culling of badgers to reduce the risk of transmission has resulted in
public opposition but is supported by farming unions [24]. Since
the 1970s, successive governments have implemented policies of
badger culling but a scientific trial of badger culling between
1998 and 2007 found limited benefits to disease incidence [25].
The availability of a badger vaccine and evidence that it could
reduce infection transmission [26,27] led the Department for Envi-
ronment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) to announce that badger
vaccination would be delivered through the Badger Vaccine
Deployment Project (BVDP) [28].1
Badger vaccination to reduce the risk of bTB transmission from
wildlife meets the four pre-conditions for risk compensation sug-
gested by Hedlund [1]. A perceived protective effect of vaccination
may be balanced by purchasing replacement stock that carries the
risk of translocating disease [29,30]. There are no regulations to
prevent this, and stock from areas of high disease incidence will
be cheaper to purchase than those from herds with a history of dis-
ease freedom. A lack of trust between the government and farmers
[31], debate over the ownership of disease management, and
increasing incidence of bTB may contribute to risk compensation
behaviours by encouraging low self-efficacy and fatalistic attitudes
amongst farmers [32,33]. Behavioural spillovers such as imple-
menting additional biosecurity measures to limit contact between
badgers and cattle may also be connected to vaccination. This may
be for two reasons. Firstly, behavioural spillovers may be explained
by cognitive dissonance theory [11] and self-perception theory
[34] whereby similar behavioural routines are changed to min-
imise tension with the newly adopted behaviour and the identity
they provide. The role of self-identity plays an important role in
understanding farmer behaviour in which the cultural idea of ‘good
farming’ [35] influences farmers’ decisions. Vaccination may there-
fore prompt farmers to take further biosecurity precautions to dis-
play the symbolic cultural capital of ‘good farmers’ [36,37]. As with
risk compensation, however, these responses may be limited
where farmers’ low self-efficacy leads them to conclude that there
is nothing they can do to prevent disease [33,38]. Secondly, culling1 Following a change in government policy in 2013, badger culls funded by farmers
have been approved. By 2019, there were 43 farmer-led badger culls across England
(see: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/bovine-tb-controlling-the-risk-of-
bovine-tb-from-badgers#licences-and-authorisations).
Please cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101can create a perturbation effect in badger populations [39] that
increases the risk of disease transmission prompting the need for
additional biosecurity. Concerns about perturbation were raised
by farmers in public meetings about vaccination attended bymem-
bers of the research team. In response, Defra stated that observa-
tion of long-term research studies of badger populations meant
that vaccination was ‘very unlikely’ to cause perturbation [28], this
was subsequently confirmed by analysis which found no evidence
of perturbation arising from badger vaccination [40].
2.2. Data
2.2.1. Study areas
Research was conducted between 2010 and 14 in five 100 km2
areas: one with badger vaccination (the BVDP) [41] and four com-
parison areas with no vaccination2. The BVDP was based in an area
of Gloucestershire in which 50% of herds had previously experienced
a bTB incident. These herds were compared with those in four
similar-sized non-vaccination areas. Three areas with long-
standing endemic bTB in cattle were chosen: Great Torrington
(Devon), Cheltenham and Tetbury (both Gloucestershire). The final
area – Congleton (Cheshire) – was chosen because it had lower
bTB incidence in cattle.
2.2.2. Farmer telephone survey
As no official longitudinal records of farmers’ biosecurity prac-
tices exist, self-reported biosecurity practices and attitudinal data
were collected using two telephone surveys. The first survey ran
between August-October in 2010 following the commencement
of the BVDP. The second was completed three months prior to its
completion during October and November 2014. Respondents
(farmers) were selected using a stratified sample of 1227 cattle
herds across the five areas, drawn from the Animal and Plant
Health Agency’s (APHA) bTB database.
For each survey area, herds were organised by herd type and
size, and every fourth herd listed was selected to be included in
the survey. Reserve herds were selected using the same process
which were used when a farmer refused to take part in the study
(78 in total). Replacement cattle herds were similar to the herd
they replaced in terms of farm type and farm size. Sampling was
proportional to the number of farms in each area and farm type
(beef and dairy) but included more dairy farms than proportionally
necessary to enable comparisons between farm types and to allow
for longitudinal attrition (see Table 1).
Self-reported data were collected for five biosecurity activities
designed to reduce cattle-badger interactions. Attitudinal data on
badger vaccination were collected by asking farmers to rate state-
ments along a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Survey items addressed respondents’ overall feelings towards bad-
ger vaccination, known as their ‘general affective evaluation’ [42],
and their perceptions of effectiveness and acceptability. Farmers
were asked to assess their herd’s susceptibility to bTB, the extent
to which they felt able to prevent bTB (‘self-efficacy’), and the role
of social norms in disease prevention. Finally, farmers were asked
who should pay for vaccination, and to score two dimensions of
trust in government: competence and commitment [43].
2.2.3. Observed farmer behaviour – Data on cattle movements
To account for risk compensation behaviour, data from the UK
Government’s Cattle Tracing System (CTS) were used to identify
the number of on-farm cattle movements prior to the survey per-
iod (2008–10) and during the final year of vaccination within the2 The BVDP was based only in Stroud. Plans for other vaccination areas were scaled
back following a change in government in 2010. Voluntary vaccination projects are
funded by government grants, but these were not considered for this study.
risk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101BVDP (2014). Data were extracted from CTS and matched to sur-
veyed herds using each herd’s County, Parish, Holding, Herd
(CPHH) unique identification code.2.2.4. Herd bTB history data
Data on each herd’s bTB history were extracted from the APHA’s
bTB database and matched to surveyed farmers using their CPHH.
Data included the number of cattle lost as a result of bTB (known as
‘reactors’); and the number of confirmed bTB incidents3 between
2010 and 14.2.2.5. Qualitative interviews
Between the two surveys, three annual rounds of face-to-face
interviews were carried out with a sub-sample of farmers selected
from the baseline survey. In the first round, 65 cattle farmers were
interviewed during October and November 2011 in the vaccination
area and two non-vaccination areas (Congleton and Great Torring-
ton). Farmers were selected based on their willingness to partici-
pate in further research, and their levels of trust in the
government and confidence in vaccination identified from
responses to the telephone survey. Farmers selected for interview
were distributed evenly across four categories representing differ-
ent levels of confidence in badger vaccination [44] (see Table 2). In
the second round of interviews in November-December 2012, 56
farmers were interviewed, and 50 in November-December 2013.
Interviews focused on farmers’ experience of bTB, their perceptions
of the causes of bTB, its management and their confidence in bad-
ger vaccination.2.3. Analysis
Qualitative interviews were fully transcribed and analysed in
Nvivo. Analysis sought to identify explanatory themes for farmers’
behavioural reactions to vaccination. Responses to the telephone
survey were analysed in SPSS. Analysis of spillover behaviour
focussed on the five self-reported biosecurity activities relating
to badger-cattle interactions. Longitudinal measures of biosecurity
practices were calculated from farmers’ self-reports in each survey
year. Analysis of risk compensation was assessed by examining
cattle movement data for each herd.
Quantitative analysis involved, firstly, a descriptive analysis of
variables in each survey year and cross-tabulations between key
statements and herd characteristics. Secondly, bivariate analysis
tested for statistically significant differences between vaccination
and non-vaccination areas, bTB status and herd characteristics
and variables relating to risk compensation and spillover beha-
viour. Bivariate analysis used parametric (Pearson correlation,
independent and paired samples t-test) and non-parametric (Chi-
square, Mann-Whitney U and Wilcoxon) tests. Thirdly, multivari-
able analysis was conducted using a negative binomial log-linear
regression. On-farm cattle movements during 2014 acted as the
dependent variable. The selection of independent variables was
informed by analysis of interview data relating to badger vaccina-
tion and disease control; and bivariate correlations to identify sim-
ilar variables with the weakest relationship with the dependent
variable eliminated. The final list of independent variables is
shown in Tables 3–5. Count variables were log transformed in SPSS
using natural logarithm, with 0.5 added to zero values prior to
transformation. Longitudinal change values were calculated by
subtracting 2010 values from 2014 values.3 Classified as evidence of lesions or culture of M. bovis at post-mortem.
risk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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4 G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxx2.4. Research ethics
Ethical approval was given by the social research ethics com-
mittees at the universities of Gloucestershire and Cardiff. Consent
was gained from all research participants: they were provided with
information on the project, reminded that their participation was
voluntary, and that they could withdraw at any time. Farmers
who completed both surveys were entered into a prize draw
(£100, £50 and £25 shopping vouchers). Farmers participating in
the annual interviews received a bottle of wine after the final
interview.3. Results
3.1. Survey response
The response rate for the baseline survey was 80%, eliciting 338
usable responses and representing 27% of the total population of
herds in the case study areas. The repeat survey in 2014 achieved
220 responses, a response rate of 65%, representing 19% of the cat-
tle farmer population in the study areas. Longitudinal attrition var-
ied from 25% (North East of Cheltenham) to 45% (Tetbury. See
Table 1). Fifteen farmers dropped out of the longitudinal inter-
views. Attrition was evenly distributed between the three study
areas.3.2. Descriptive analysis
3.2.1. Herd characteristics
In 2010 the mean herd size was 160, and 167 in 2014 (see
Tables 6 and 7). Dairy herds were significantly larger (p < 0.001),
with 73% of dairy herds having over 100 cattle. Herd sizes in
2010 were highly correlated with those in 2014 (r = 0.880,
p < 0.001). The proportion of herds under bTB restrictions at the
time of the survey was similar in both years (16.9% compared to
20.0%). The vaccination area had the largest proportion of herds
with bTB at the time of the 2014 survey (22.2%).3.2.2. On-farm cattle movements
Prior to the survey and deployment of badger vaccination, 85.5%
of surveyed farms had on-farm cattle movements. During the sur-
vey/vaccination period, this fell to 75.5%. Taking both periods
together, 7.3% farms had no on-farm cattle movements. Amongst
dairy herds, 94.5% had on-farm cattle movements, and 86.1% of
herds that experienced a bTB incident had on-farm cattle move-
ments. Prior to the start of the BVDP in 2010, 69.1% of herds in
the vaccination area had on-farm movements compared to 90.9%
of farms in non-vaccination areas (p < 0.001). Herds that had expe-
rienced a bTB incident during the survey period were more likely
to have on-farm cattle movements in 2014 (p < 0.001).3.2.3. Biosecurity activities
Farmers’ self-reported biosecurity activities were low in both
survey years (see Tables 8 and 9). The most common activity was
badger-proofing feed stores in 2010 (69.1%) and 2014 (57.1%).
Implementation of new activities during the survey period was
also low: between 12% (fencing setts and latrines) to 17% (raising
feed and water troughs) of farmers reported adopting a new biose-
curity activity between 2010 and 14. Farmers in the vaccination
area were more likely to fence off badger latrines in 2010
(p = 0.011) and 2014 (p = 0.004) and fence off badger setts
(2010, p = 0.016; 2014, p = 0.002). Similarly, farmers in the vacci-
nation area were also more likely to start fencing off badger latri-
nes (p = 0.001) and setts (p = 0.001) between 2010 and 14.Please cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.1013.2.4. Attitudes to badger vaccination
Farmers’ attitudes to vaccination were generally negative in
2010 and became more negative in 2014 (Table 9). By 2014, fewer
farmers thought vaccination was acceptable (p < 0.001), was a
good thing to do (p = 0.003), or gave them confidence about avoid-
ing bTB (p = 0.002). Farmers’ general affective evaluation of vacci-
nation was higher in the vaccination area in 2010 and 2014
(p < 0.001). However, these farmers also became more negative
over time: fewer thought vaccination was acceptable (p = 0.032),
had confidence in vaccination (p = 0.023), or believed it would
reduce their chances of getting bTB (p < 0.001) in 2014 than in
2010. Farmers with herds that had suffered a bTB incident between
2010 and 14 were more likely to believe that the government
should pay for badger vaccination (p = 0.008) and that their herds
were susceptible to bTB (p < 0.001 both survey years).
3.3. Generalised linear model
Thirteen variables were statistically significant (p < 0.05) (see
Table 10). The model shows evidence of risk compensation
amongst surveyed farmers: those in the vaccination area had more
on-farm cattle movements (p = 0.021) even when adjusting for a
large number of other independent variables. Dairy herds had
more on-farm cattle movements (p < 0.001) as were larger herds
(p < 0.001 both years). Herds with bTB reactors in 2014 were not
associated with more on-farm movements, but they were in
2010 (p < 0.001). Prior cattle movement practices (in 2008–10)
were also related to those in 2014 (p = 0.007).
Farms that had always fenced off badger setts had the lowest
number of on-farm cattle movements. However, only in non-
vaccination areas was the relationship between new biosecurity
activities and lower cattle movements significant (p = 0.035).
Four of the nine longitudinal attitudinal variables were signifi-
cantly related to cattle movements. Farmers with lower cattle
movements were more likely to have a positive general affective
evaluation of vaccination (p = 0.001) and increasing levels of self-
efficacy (p = 0.006). Farmers who believed they had become more
susceptible to bTB moved on fewer cattle (p = 0.041), as did those
who increasingly thought that the government should pay for vac-
cination (p < 0.001). On-farm cattle movements were not con-
nected to trust in government or social norms.
In the non-vaccination areas, farmers who believed that the
government should pay for vaccination had higher on-farm cattle
movements (p = 0.005). In the vaccination area, farmers moved
on fewer cattle if they believed badgers posed a risk to their bTB
status (p = 0.004).
3.4. Qualitative interviews with farmers
Analysis of qualitative interviews revealed that vaccination
failed to fit with farmers’ cultural understandings of disease. This
stemmed, firstly, from farmers’ beliefs that the spread of bTB was
due to a rise in the badger population. Farmers therefore believed
the most effective disease control measures would be to reduce the
badger population. These arguments were connected to farmers’
broader cultural understandings of nature that emphasised the
need for a ‘‘natural balance”. In distinguishing between ‘healthy’
and ‘diseased’ badgers, farmers argued that healthy badgers
needed to be protected to ward off diseased badgers, whilst those
that were diseased needed to be euthanised.
Secondly, badger vaccination proved unpopular because it
lacked ‘practice similarity’ – in that its practicalities were dissimi-
lar to other vaccination practices that farmers employed. Explain-
ing their opposition to badger vaccination, farmers consistently
drew on their own experiences of vaccinating cattle against other
diseases. Farmers argued that vaccinating badgers that wererisk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
6/j.vaccine.2019.11.037
Table 2
Interviewees by type of and category of vaccination confidence.
Vaccination area Non-vaccination areas Total
Congleton Great Torrington
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
Acceptance 9 9 9 6 5 5 4 3 2 19 17 16
Distrust 4 2 2 3 3 2 7 6 6 14 11 10
Critical Acceptance 3 3 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 13 11 10
Critical Trust 4 4 3 8 6 6 7 7 5 19 17 14
Total 20 18 17 22 18 16 23 20 17 65 56 50
Table 3
Herd characteristic variables used in the Generalised Linear Model.
Concept Dimension Variable name Variable
type
Data type Source
Herd management
characteristics
Movements 2010–2014 2014Movements Dependent Count CTS
Movements 2008–2010 movementslog200810 Independent Count, log transformed using natural
logarithm
Herd characteristics Herd Size 2010 herdsizelog2010 Independent Count, log transformed using natural
logarithm
APHA bTB Dataset
Herd Size 2014 herdsizelog2014 Independent
Herd disease characteristics Number of bTB Reactors
2008–2010
reactors2010log Independent
Number of bTB Reactors
2010–2014
reactors2014log Independent
Vaccination In the BVDP area In bvdp (2010) Independent Dummy variable (vaccination/not
vaccination)
Herd type Dairy herd Dairy Herd in 2014 Independent Dummy variable (dairy/not dairy) APHA bTB Dataset /
Survey
Table 4
Survey variables used in the Generalised Linear Model.
Concept Dimension Survey question Variable
type
Data type
Longitudinal
attitudes to
vaccination
2010–2014
Vaccine
acceptability
Badger vaccination is an acceptable way of
dealing with bTB
Independent 1–5 Scale (strongly disagree – strongly agree)
Calculated scale (2014 minus 2010 value): 4 (more negative)
to + 4 (more positive)Vaccine general
affective
evaluation
think vaccinating badgers is a good thing to do Independent
Vaccine
effectiveness
Badger vaccination will help me feel more
confident about avoiding TB restrictions
Independent
Vaccine
responsibility
Paying for badger vaccination should be the
Government’s responsibility
Independent
Vaccine self-
efficacy
It’s a matter of luck if my herd goes down with
bTB*
Independent
Vaccine social
norms
My chances of getting TB are lower if I follow
what other farmers in the area do
Independent
Disease
susceptibility
My herd is susceptible because of badgers on or
near my farm
Independent
Trust in
government:
commitment
The Government is committed to reducing bTB Independent
Trust in
government:
competency
The Government is doing a good job in relation
to bTB
Independent
Longitudinal
biosecurity
spillover
activities
Fence off badger
setts
Which of the following activities have you
undertaken on your farm: Fencing off Badger
Setts
Independent Yes/no
Longitudinal categories calculated from 2010 and 2014
responses: Never; Adopted by 2014; Always had; Stopped by
2014**
Notes:
* Reversed scale.
** Converted to dummy variables for analysis in GLM.
G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxx 5already infected was pointless, and just like their own approach to
herd-health, badgers would need to be tested to see which ones
were infected (and culled) whilst the remainder were vaccinated.
Equally, farmers’ experiences of vaccinating all cattle against dis-
eases other than bTB, meant that in their view, badger vaccination
would work only if 100% of badgers were vaccinated. Farmers
thought this was impractical at the scale at which the vaccine
needed to be administered.Please cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101Practicality was also a key reason in dismissing potential spil-
lover behaviours such as biosecurity. Farmers suggested these
would involve significant cost or disruptive changes to farm man-
agement. The challenges of effectively separating cattle from bad-
gers at pasture was frequently cited as one reason for not
implementing biosecurity, which was matched by widespread con-
cern that farmers were unable to control bTB and that it was sim-
ply a matter of bad luck. These fatalistic attitudes towardsrisk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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Table 5
Descriptive statistics of variables used in the Generalised Linear Model.
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Percent
No. on-farm cattle movements 2014 198 0.00 6064.00 301.32 662.80 –
Herd size 2010 (Log)1 198 0.69 7.31 4.11 1.80 –
Herd size 2014 (Log)1 198 0.69 7.38 4.11 1.88 –
On-farm cattle movements 2008–10 (Log)1 198 0.69 8.96 3.88 2.32 –
No. reactors 2010 (Log)1 198 0.69 5.72 1.12 1.86 –
No. reactors 2014 (Log)1 198 0.69 4.32 0.28 1.34 –
In vaccination area 198 0.00 1.00 0.26 0.44 –
Dairy Herd 198 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.47 –
Vaccine acceptability 198 3.00 3.00 0.37 1.28 –
Vaccine general affective evaluation 198 4.00 3.00 0.26 1.26 –
Vaccine effectiveness 198 4.00 3.00 0.36 1.29 –
Vaccine responsibility 198 4.00 3.00 0.09 0.98 –
Vaccine self-efficacy 198 4.00 4.00 0.16 1.29 –
Vaccine social norms 198 3.00 3.00 0.02 1.20 –
Disease susceptibility 198 4.00 3.00 0.08 1.16 –
Trust in government: commitment 198 3.00 3.00 0.01 1.28 –
Trust in government: competency 198 3.00 3.00 0.30 1.37 –
Never fenced badger setts 135.00 0 1 – – 68.20%
Fenced badger setts in 2014 26.00 0 1 – – 13.10%
Always have fenced badger setts 17.00 0 1 – – 8.60%
Stopped fencing badger setts by 2014 20.00 0 1 – – 10.10%
Notes
1 Natural log transformation applied to variables.
Table 6
Characteristics of all herds in the research areas.
No Herds (n) Under bTB
Restrictions
at time of
2010 survey
Confirmed bTB
incidents(mean)
Days under bTB
restriction (mean)
Number of
reactors (mean)
Movements
2008–10 (mean)
Herd size (mean)
n %
Vaccination area
Stroud Dairy 67 12 17.91 2.57 827.93 34.94 295.59 214.69
Beef 158 12 7.59 2.32 330.45 8.6 355.7 83.49
Mixed 33 3 9.09 1.67 215.73 3.33 307.27 51.32
Total 258 27 10.47 2.35 444.97 14.77 333.75 116.35
Non-vaccination area
Cheltenham Dairy 10 4 40.00 2.78 1232.0 97.60 329.22 238.6
Beef 92 16 17.39 2.52 534.55 17.78 155.07 88.3
Mixed 12 0 0.00 1.67 125.58 2.0 63.25 46.17
Total 114 20 17.54 2.52 552.68 23.12 163.48 100.32
Tetbury Dairy 34 5 14.71 2.37 760.0 27.65 474.69 305.7
Beef 95 12 12.63 1.80 202.66 4.62 145.34 68.75
Mixed 19 3 15.79 1.88 156.58 3.95 317.87 71.94
Total 148 20 13.51 2.01 324.78 9.82 241.86 123.45
Congleton Dairy 148 14 9.46 1.89 267.22 17.76 271.89 164.35
Beef 227 7 3.08 1.24 66.11 1.49 97.03 40.23
Mixed 51 1 1.96 1.38 54.9 1.53 132.16 55.65
Total 426 22 5.16 1.63 134.64 7.15 164.81 87.34
Great Torrington Dairy 66 16 24.24 2.20 1047.5 41.77 395.7 330.52
Beef 189 15 7.94 1.86 309.25 6.28 163.66 83.19
Mixed 26 1 3.85 1.25 211.58 3.46 166.72 72.72
Total 281 32 11.39 1.96 473.61 14.36 222.18 141.81
Total Dairy 325 51 15.69 2.24 622.51 29.67 324.37 225.3
Beef 761 62 8.15 2.01 255.06 6.52 181.78 69.38
Mixed 141 8 5.67 1.57 141.15 2.67 200.06 60.52
Total 1227 121 9.86 2.07 339.3 12.21 223.47 111.76
6 G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxxbiosecurity were reinforced by a belief – particularly amongst dairy
farmers – that these activities did not benefit their own social or
economic status.
In the vaccination area, the visibility of vaccination itself was
also limited. Farmers’ contact with the team delivering vaccination
varied markedly. Some farmers knew the number of badgers that
had been vaccinated but others raised concerns about the level
of communication they had received from scientists running the
project. Some farmers claimed they had ‘‘no idea” when the lastPlease cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101or next time badgers would be vaccinated on their farm. Those that
had a bTB outbreak during the BVDP questioned whether vaccina-
tion had contributed to the incident. In short, the lack of visibility
of the very intervention that could prompt spillover behaviours is
likely to have negatively impacted upon farmers’ perceptions of
the need for other complementary biosecurity behaviours.
The politics of badger vaccination and disease control were also
of significance to farmers. Interviews revealed a lack of trust in the
government to deal effectively with bTB. Farmers suggested therisk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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Table 7
Characteristics of surveyed herds.
Herd size (mean) Confirmed bTB
incidents
(mean)
Cattle movement
(mean)
Days under bTB
restriction (mean)
Number of bTB
Reactors (mean)
Herds under
bTB restriction
(%)
2010 2014 2010 2014 2008–10 2014 2010 2014 2010 2014 2010 2014
Vaccination area
Stroud Dairy 260.5 247.61 2.32 1.09 290.55 908.52 939.2 156.87 35.84 4.83 40.0 26.09
Beef 161.32 151.36 1.33 0.44 457.59 107.32 380.1 99.48 6.57 3.08 27.27 20.0
Mixed 61.92 91.67 0.33 – 33.0 20.17 101.33 29.67 3.17 – – 16.67
All 175.96 185.72 1.46 0.67 301.37 438.89 527.96 116.17 16.48 3.48 25.93 22.22
Non-vaccination areas
Cheltenham Dairy 147.8 153.33 2.80 0.50 237.0 252.67 1406.6 217.17 152.4 1.33 20.0 66.67
Beef 211.0 131.75 1.54 0.93 604.23 132.14 499.00 118.96 20.31 4.64 15.38 10.71
Mixed 94.89 15.5 2.06 1.00 145.22 40.0 555.18 123.5 19.17 4.0 22.22 –
All 144.17 128.89 1.97 0.86 323.72 147.11 655.94 135.58 38.08 4.06 19.44 19.44
Tetbury Dairy 373.33 453.75 2.11 1.13 434.22 1442.13 848.56 250.63 17.11 15.63 22.22 50.0
Beef 56.40 58.0 1.14 0.58 109.33 91.47 171.14 90.84 4.86 2.74 – 5.26
Mixed 49.78 150.0 0.89 – 71.78 25.0 203.22 – 3.89 – 11.11 –
All 141.03 174.36 1.34 0.71 187.7 475.0 370.69 133.25 8.03 6.32 9.09 17.86
Congelton Dairy 260.0 212.48 1.37 0.57 318.25 417.43 307.8 63.22 14.0 4.04 10.0 9.09
Beef 72.63 73.11 0.47 0.32 112.79 38.89 119.63 44.0 3.16 3.11 10.53 5.26
Mixed 30.71 147.2 0.25 0.40 84.5 366.4 60.38 5.4 0.88 4.20 – 20.0
All 145.22 149.19 0.80 0.45 195.4 258.98 189.62 49.3 7.24 3.68 8.51 8.7
Great torrington Dairy 316.0 351.15 2.67 1.15 399.23 874.46 1334.08 219.62 57.5 7.77 53.85 15.38
Beef 180.43 132.28 0.86 0.33 329.71 72.94 394.79 144.22 7.43 1.31 35.71 13.89
Mixed 111.73 – 0.73 – 114.73 – 283.05 – 4.45 – 18.18 –
All 185.55 190.35 1.25 0.55 251.63 285.59 578.4 164.22 18.58 3.02 32.65 14.29
Total Dairy 278.14 269.82 2.11 0.89 335.21 752.3 842.71 153.77 39.89 6.0 29.85 25.0
Beef 133.06 115.95 1.05 0.52 317.12 90.44 304.51 106.87 7.83 2.87 18.07 11.81
Mixed 81.94 104.79 0.97 0.29 99.36 147.0 282.25 32.29 7.58 2.07 13.04 14.29
All 161.17 167.71 1.34 0.63 254.05 319.92 462.68 117.99 17.34 3.89 20.09 16.43
Table 8
Longitudinal changes to biosecurity activities.
Never had Adopted in 2014 but not 2010 Always had Used in 2010 but not in 2014 x2
Non-vaccination area Fence Latrines 86.6% 10.4% 1.2% 1.8% 0.001
Fence Setts 76.8% 8.5% 7.3% 7.3% 0.001
Secure Buildings 46.6% 14.1% 28.8% 10.4% 0.791
Badger proofing 12.9% 15.3% 42.3% 29.4% 0.100
Raising Troughs 23.2% 18.3% 31.7% 26.8% 0.126
Vaccination area Fence Latrines 66.7% 16.7% 13.0% 3.7% 0.001
Fence Setts 48.1% 22.2% 13.0% 16.7% 0.001
Secure Buildings 48.1% 18.5% 25.9% 7.4% 0.819
Badger proofing 25.9% 13.0% 42.6% 18.5% 0.107
Raising Troughs 25.9% 13.0% 46.3% 14.8% 0.124
G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxx 7ownership of the problem lay with the government and policy ini-
tiatives for encourage farmers to ‘take ownership’ of bTB [45] were
viewed suspiciously. It was common for farmers to suggest that
ideas of responsibility had been pushed onto the agricultural
industry because of government failings. Farmers therefore per-
ceived the government to be handing over their ‘dirty work’. The
government’s failure to implement a badger cull policy in 2011
also contributed to the belief that they could not be trusted to
manage bTB effectively.4. Discussion
The strongest predictors of cattle movements were herd-level
characteristics, such as herd size and type, prior disease incidence
and management methods. Whilst the analysis shows these to be
related to on-farm cattle movements, they are also well estab-
lished risk factors for bTB [32]. The analysis therefore suggests
the presence of a cycle of infection: movements in 2008–10 are
related to disease incidence in subsequent years, which are further
related to subsequent cattle movements. As highlighted by the
qualitative research, these herd management practices can be dif-Please cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101ficult to change, reflecting what Sutherland et al. [46] refer to as
‘path-dependent’ behaviours. Path-dependency may depend on
social, economic and environmental factors, but disrupting these
embedded behaviours requires specific triggers to prompt change.
Potential triggers include disease outbreaks, and potentially gov-
ernment interventions and/or significant policy changes. In this
case, however, disease incidence seems to be an insufficient dis-
ruption to existing deeply embedded farming practices. This may
lead not only to an embedded cycle of disease, but also reinforces
existing behaviours and may explain the limited adoption of biose-
curity activities.
This explanation also applies to the relative lack of spillover
activities. There is only limited evidence of spillover in the vaccina-
tion area and adoption was only significantly higher in the vaccina-
tion area for two of the five biosecurity activities. For those farmers
that did report new biosecurity activities, the outstanding question
is why? It could be these increases represent a form of social desir-
ability bias [47] in which farmers have become more aware of the
conduct expected of them by government. There is little evidence
though that implementing new biosecurity activities is related to
‘good farming’ cultural identities [35]. Being seen to be a ‘good
farmer’ and practice ‘good farming’ can be relevant in the adoptionrisk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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Table 9
Descriptive statistics and bivariate analysis of vaccine attitudes and biosecurity activities.
Survey All
herds
Dairy
herds
Vaccination
area
TB free
herds
Herds with on-movements
(2014)
Year Mean/% Mean/% Mean/% Mean/% Mean/%
Badger vaccination is an acceptable way of dealing with bTB 2010 2.93 2.81 3.07 3.02 2.91
2014 2.56*** 2.36 2.67 2.70 2.56
Paying for badger vaccination should be the Government’s responsibility 2010 4.17 4.33++ 4.31 4.15 4.15
2014 4.26 4.25 4.29 4.10+++ 4.28
I think vaccinating badgers is a good thing to do 2010 3.13 3.13 3.53+++ 3.19 3.13
2014 2.87*** 2.95 3.24+++ 2.94 2.90
Badger vaccination will help me feel more confident about avoiding TB
restrictions
2010 2.95 2.85 3.04 3.03 2.98
2014 2.61** 2.47 2.60 2.69 2.60
Badger vaccination will reduce the chances of my herd going under bTB
restrictions
2010 3.19 3.16 3.35 3.19 3.19
2014 2.91*** 2.90 2.69 2.89 2.86
The Government is doing a good job in relation to bTB 2010 2.53 2.39 2.11 2.73+++ 2.48
2014 2.24*** 2.21 2.45 2.30 2.25
The Government takes its commitments to reducing bTB seriously 2010 3.19 3.05 2.95- 3.30 3.14
2014 3.23 3.18 3.20 3.27 3.21
The Government cares about reducing bTB 2010 3.72 3.61 3.52 3.75 3.68
2014 2.74*** 2.67 2.67 2.77 2.77
My herd is susceptible because of badgers on or near my farm 2010 4.02 4.34+++ 3.83 3.78+++ 4.10+
2014 4.07 4.19 3.78 3.79+++ 4.09
It is a matter of luck if my herd goes down with bTB (reversed scale) 2010 2.22 2.29 2.28 2.15 2.26
2014 2.33 2.56 2.73+++ 2.39 2.31
My chances of getting TB are lower if I follow what other farmers in the area
do
2010 2.73 2.90 2.57 2.78 2.69
2014 2.84 2.83 2.73 2.87 2.77
Without fence off badger latrines 2010 91.8% 90.4% 83.6% 93.9% 92.1%
2014 83.0%** 79.5% 70.4% 86.0% 81.7%
Without fence off badger setts 2010 81.7% 72.6% 70.9% 85.2% 80.0%
2014 79.4% 75.3% 64.8% 83.3% 81.1%
Without secure buildings from badgers 2010 62.1% 57.5% 67.3% 62.3% 59.0%
2014 56.7% 56.2% 55.6% 57.9% 54.6%
Without badger proof feed stores 2010 30.9% 30.1% 40.0% 34.8% 28.3%
2014 42.9%** 43.8% 44.4% 44.7% 41.7%
Without raised feed and water troughs 2010 40.6% 36.1% 40.0% 44.3% 38.2%
2014 47.7% 41.1% 40.7% 56.1% 43.9%
Notes:
Within-year comparisons (Independent samples t-test/Mann-Whitney U test).
/+ sig. p < 0.05.
/++ p < 0.01.
/+++ p < 0.001.
2010–2014 Comparisons (Paired samples t-test/Wilcoxon sign test).
*sig. p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
8 G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxxof some biosecurity management practices [36,37]. Likewise, stud-
ies of spillover suggest that the visibility of new behaviours can
help to reinforce and publicly affirm positive subjectivities such
as the ‘responsible citizen’ [48]. In this case however, the low-
level adoption of biosecurity may instead reflect the activities of
‘niche’ identities that are yet to become mainstream [46]. Helping
these cultural identities to become established is a challenge facing
policy makers. New methods to make the benefits of biosecurity
publicly visible and disrupt existing social norms amongst farmers
could help. This could include, for example, the mandatory use of
bTB herd risk ratings to regulate cattle purchasing [38]. As well
as potentially contributing to spillover, these methods could also
limit risk compensation behaviour in wildlife control areas.
Further research is therefore required to establish the reasons
why a minority of farmers adopt new biosecurity measures, and
the extent to which they count as spillover from badger vaccina-
tion or other initiatives. In general, however, the failure to imple-
ment new forms of biosecurity is more readily explained by the
attitudes held by farmers displayed in both the surveys and the
qualitative research. The consistency of these attitudes, showing
little change between 2010 and 14, suggests that triggers like dis-
ease outbreaks or new disease control policies (such as vaccina-
tion) have little impact upon existing attitudes or behaviours.
In terms of risk compensation, the analysis finds conflicting evi-
dence. On the one hand, the evidence suggests an associationPlease cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101between risk compensation behaviours and badger vaccination.
Separate analysis of farms in the vaccination area shows reduced
on-farm cattle movements for farmers who increasingly thought
vaccination was a good thing to do, that bTB was not down to luck,
and with perceptions of increasing bTB risk. Potentially, changes in
these attitudes may reflect a form of educational spillover from
vaccination that modifies farmer behaviour. In general, however,
attitudes towards vaccination were negative and the government
was distrusted to manage bTB. Moreover, whilst farmers were
aware they were in a vaccination area, frequently they were una-
ware of whether their badgers had been vaccinated and felt dis-
tanced from the practice of vaccination. Further research is
therefore required to unpack how interventions such as vaccina-
tion encourage new behaviours and farming practices. For exam-
ple, to what extent do factors specific to the vaccination area, not
accounted for in the model, explain farmers’ behaviour? One pos-
sibility might be the role of social networks and the significance of
influential advisers such as local veterinarians.
Of particular importance to policy makers is the relationship
between cattle movement practices and self-efficacy, and attitudes
to the ownership of disease management. Firstly, low levels of self-
efficacy – such as the fatalistic views of bTB transmission and the
role of luck – replicate earlier qualitative research on farmers’
understandings of bTB [33]. Results presented here show for the
first time how these low levels of self-efficacy can impact uponrisk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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Table 10
Results – negative binomial with log link Generalised Linear Model for 2014 on-farm movements, p-values < 0.05 are shown in bold.
All respondents Not in vaccination area In vaccination area
Parameter 95% Wald
Confidence
Interval for Exp
(B)
95% Wald
Confidence
Interval for Exp
(B)
95% Wald
Confidence
Interval for Exp
(B)
Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper Sig. Exp(B) Lower Upper
(Intercept) <0.001 6.232 3.011 12.897 <0.001 6.023 2.318 15.646 0.169 0.167 0.013 2.139
Never fenced setts 0.039 0.569 0.333 0.972 0.108 0.545 0.260 1.142 0.751 1.236 0.334 4.581
Fenced setts in 2014 but not 2010 0.010 0.415 0.213 0.809 0.022 0.320 0.121 0.850 0.726 1.234 0.381 3.994
Always fenced setts <0.001 0.279 0.138 0.563 0.035 0.336 0.122 0.924 0.110 0.304 0.071 1.308
Stopped fencing setts in 2014a . 1.000 . . . 1.000 . . . 1.000 . .
Herd size 2010 <0.001 1.267 1.133 1.417 0.021 1.171 1.024 1.339 <0.001 3.003 1.654 5.453
Herd size 2014 <0.001 1.329 1.170 1.510 <0.001 1.411 1.193 1.669 0.486 1.136 0.793 1.628
No. reactors 2010 0.464 1.046 0.927 1.180 0.084 1.136 0.983 1.311 0.374 0.847 0.588 1.220
No. reactors 2014 <0.001 1.392 1.231 1.574 <0.001 1.336 1.143 1.562 0.732 1.066 0.740 1.535
No. on-farm cattle movements 2008–10 0.007 1.152 1.040 1.277 0.006 1.192 1.051 1.353 0.118 1.227 0.949 1.587
In vaccination area 0.021 1.580 1.070 2.334 . 1.000 . . . 1.000 . .
Dairy herd <0.001 3.539 2.443 5.125 <0.001 2.639 1.668 4.173 0.015 3.347 1.261 8.882
Vaccine Acceptability 0.157 1.131 0.954 1.341 0.213 1.140 0.928 1.401 0.678 0.910 0.582 1.422
Vaccine general affective Evaluation 0.001 0.728 0.600 0.884 0.133 0.839 0.667 1.055 0.072 0.620 0.368 1.044
Vaccine effectiveness 0.162 1.126 0.953 1.330 0.446 1.086 0.879 1.342 0.621 1.122 0.712 1.767
Vaccine responsibility <0.001 1.332 1.138 1.558 0.005 1.291 1.079 1.546 0.099 1.418 0.937 2.147
Vaccine self-efficacy 0.006 0.841 0.744 0.951 0.624 0.960 0.814 1.131 0.089 0.788 0.598 1.037
Vaccine social norms 0.405 1.054 0.931 1.195 0.355 1.068 0.929 1.229 0.774 0.938 0.606 1.453
Disease susceptibility 0.041 0.875 0.769 0.994 0.743 1.030 0.863 1.229 0.004 0.668 0.509 0.877
Trust in government: Commitment 0.977 1.002 0.875 1.147 0.800 0.979 0.829 1.155 0.189 1.258 0.893 1.772
Trust in government: Competency 0.471 1.053 0.916 1.210 0.447 1.068 0.901 1.266 0.819 0.947 0.595 1.508
Notes:
a This category is the baseline against which ‘‘Never fenced setts”, ‘‘Fences setts in 2014 but not 2010” and ‘‘Always fenced setts” are compared.
G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxx 9the transmission of bTB by being significantly related to on-farm
cattle movements. This shows the importance to policy makers
of taking farmers’ self-efficacy seriously when managing disease:
when farmers lose faith in disease management and their ability
to do anything about disease, their actions may increase disease
risks. This may explain the apparent conflict between risk compen-
sation and farmers’ sceptical attitudes towards vaccination effec-
tiveness. Rather than beliefs in vaccination effectiveness driving
risk compensation, as Hedlund’s conditions would suggest, higher
levels of on-farm cattle movements in vaccination areas may be
attributable to farmers’ perceived lack of alternative options or
their belief that any risk reduction measures they take will be
ineffective.
Secondly, both qualitative and quantitative data revealed how
farmers believed that it was the government’s responsibility to
deal with bTB, and where they did they were more likely to engage
in risky behaviour and eschew risk reduction measures. This is sig-
nificant for two reasons. Firstly, the governance of disease and its
‘ownership’ by the farming industry has been cited as a key factor
in successful disease eradication programmes [49,50]. These
results suggest that attempts to encourage a greater sense of own-
ership of bTB amongst English farmers is required if they are not to
undermine the efforts of disease management policy. This could
include allowing farmers greater say in the governance of disease
and/or the use of financial levies to both fund disease control
and help develop a collective sense of responsibility [38]. These
findings also suggest that perceptions of ‘ownership’ need to be
added to Hedlund’s preconditions of risk compensation. In this
sense, it is not enough to simply have confidence in a disease con-
trol intervention, such as vaccination, to reduce the perception of
risk. Rather, interventions need to be delivered by and paid for
by the people or agencies perceived to be the most appropriate:
those that are not are unlikely to succeed. It is not clear, however,
whether ownership is more or less relevant to all interventions, or
whether those that fit cultural understandings of disease manage-
ment (in this case, badger culling) means it is less significant.Please cite this article as: G. Enticott, D. Maye, R. Naylor et al., An assessment of
use of vaccines in animal disease management, Vaccine, https://doi.org/10.101Further research is therefore required to assess the extent of risk
compensation and its relationship with other wildlife control
measures.
These findings also confirm wider concerns in the spillover lit-
erature. Analysis confirms that farmers appear to be consistent in
their risk-taking: either adopting biosecurity and reducing cattle
movements, or vice-versa. Given concerns about the ownership
of disease, this may not be surprising: there was no cost of vacci-
nation to farmers and as such they are likely to have placed little
value on it. Moreover, previous studies suggest that spillover
occurs when new practices are functionally and culturally similar
to those that are already used [11]. This research confirms this in
two ways. Spillover behaviours depend on the similarity between
related but different practices – referred to as ‘practice similarity’.
In this case, badger vaccination was not perceived to be similar to
farmers’ existing herd health management practices. Badger vacci-
nation was also inconsistent with farmers’ cultural beliefs on dis-
ease transmission and the management of wildlife. Other social
research of veterinary vaccines finds similar results. For example,
Heffernan, Thomson [51] shows how the use of vaccines for Foot
and Mouth Disease in Bolivia did not relate to factors such as effi-
cacy, but to a match between cultural beliefs of disease aetiology
and lay beliefs about how vaccines work.
The study has a number of limitations that should be addressed
by further research. Firstly, there was only one vaccination area
and it was not large. External validity would be improved with
comparative data from vaccination areas in other parts of England
and Wales with different farming characteristics and bTB infection
risk. Secondly, using the number of on-farm cattle movements as
an example of risk compensation does not take into account their
degree of risk. Taking into account the disease histories of pur-
chased cattle in further analysis would help to inform policy deci-
sions over the need to introduce risk-based trading schemes to
limit cattle movements [21]. The contextual nature of farming
decisions highlights the importance of on-going detailed social
research. In particular, research targeted at understanding therisk compensation and spillover behavioural adaptions associated with the
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10 G. Enticott et al. / Vaccine xxx (xxxx) xxxdecision making process in cattle purchasing decisions [52] would
provide a greater level of understanding to risk compensation
behaviour. Finally, risk compensation (or spillover) following vac-
cination may be encountered in different disease contexts (exotic
and endemic diseases) and for different animals (farmed and com-
panion). Further research in all these different contexts can help
provide a broader understanding of how and why behavioural
adaptions to animal health interventions occur.5. Conclusion
Integral to an understanding of how animal disease control
interventions work is an appreciation of what behavioural changes
they provoke. This paper has investigated for the first time
whether risk compensation and/or spillover behaviours are associ-
ated with the vaccination of wildlife to control the spread of animal
disease. Evidence of these behavioural reactions is important for
policy makers in order to effectively plan disease control interven-
tions. In focusing on the behavioural impacts amongst farmers of
badger vaccination, this paper finds limited evidence of spillover
behaviour whilst apparent risk compensation behaviour may be
better explained as a reaction to low self-efficacy and a poor match
between vaccination and farmers’ cultural understandings of dis-
ease management. Crucially, perceptions of the ownership of dis-
ease management appear to be linked to farmers’ disease
management practices that may also contribute to a reinforcement
of existing behaviours. The results provide important lessons for
policy makers seeking to manage the spread of animal disease.
Given their importance, further research should be directed to
analyses of risk compensation and spillover behaviours in relation
to other disease control measures and uses of vaccination for other
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